Foundational physics and empiricist critique by Sklar, Lawrence
Lawrence Sklar 
Foundational Physics and Empiricist 
Critique 
1 
Empiricism is not a very popular methodological or epistemological stance 
nowadays, and we all know why. It presupposes the existence of sensory contents 
both as uncontaminated by theory and as present to us in a way so as to serve as 
the foundation of our corpus of rational belief. But Gestalt considerations tell us 
that the presuppositionless empirical content is a myth, and considerations famil-
iar since the idealists tell us that only the propositional can play a role in the in-
ferential structure of justification, and not "objects" as sense contents were sup-
posed to be (if "objects" of a peculiar sort). To go beyond rational belief in 
particular facts, empiricism requires, also, rules of inductive inference supported 
on a priori grounds. But both traditional Humean skepticism about the rationality 
of induction and more recent objections based on the absence of any a priori basis 
for a selection of "natural kinds" relative to which inductive generalizations are 
to be formed, cast grave doubts on the possibility of a coherently formulated and 
rationalizable empiricist account of the confirmation of generalities. 
Even if we could rationally found our general beliefs about observables in the 
manner that the empiricist suggests, his doctrine would still be inadequate as a 
reconstruction of scientific knowledge. For despite all the effort made to over-
come the well-known long-standing problems, we still don't understand how, be-
ginning with empiricist preconceptions, we can explicate our understanding of 
theoretical concepts, realistically construed, nor rationalize our inference to the-
ory that posits what, to the empiricist, are unobservable entities and structures 
in the world. Indeed, if the perceptual basis is confined to the familiar empiricist 
realm of the private contents of sensory awareness, it is hard to understand how 
we could, on empiricist precepts, develop an intersubjective account of the world 
at all. 
Worse yet are the difficulties the empiricist faces in giving us an adequate 
reconstruction of how we come to grasp the meaning of the terms essential to 
frame our scientific hypotheses. The empiricist semantic foundation of basic 
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words acquiring meaning in the presuppositionless way by means of the inten-
tional association of the word with an "idea in the mind" ostensively presented 
is, for a variety ofreasons (some of which overlap the skeptical arguments against 
the empiricist notion of the "given" as an epistemic foundation), a dubious ground 
on which to base a theory of meaning or the grasp of meaning. And-in a manner 
similar to the epistemic doubts that, even given an empiricist foundation for 
knowledge, we could on the basis of that foundation reconstruct the body of ob-
jective, scientific knowledge-the empiricist semantic foundation, even if it ex-
isted, provides too subjective and too flimsy a ground on which to base our com-
prehension of the meanings of the terms in a public, scientific language fully 
possessed of the resources to refer to and describe even the unobservable. 
In the face of these difficulties with traditional empiricism, we have been 
presented with alternative models of scientific meaning accrual and scientific 
epistemic justification. Various varieties of "realism" and "pragmatism" share 
common objections to empiricist presuppositions and common alternatives to 
some empiricist claims, even though they at least seem, in places, to differ from 
one another in their own reconstructive approaches. 
For the realist the analysis of any such notions as the delimitation of the domain 
of the observable, the reference of language to the world, or the distinction be-
tween justified and unjustified rules of epistemic inference is a matter for our best 
available natural science to explore, not any matter of a priori armchair 
philosophizing. We can, indeed, explore our place as observers in the realm of 
nature by means of neurophysiology and empirical psychology, but cannot hope 
to found our already existing best-available science on some myth of the prescien-
tific given. We can also naturalistically study our place as language users in the 
natural world, but can't hope for some philosophical semantics that will offer us 
an analysis of what meaning in general must be, again in advance of any naturalis-
tic scientific theory being accepted by us. And we can, from the standpoint of an 
accepted scientific world view, ask which rules of epistemic inference will relia-
bly lead us to the truth; but we can have no hope of justifying, in advance of ac-
cepting a scientific picture of the world, some general principles ofrational infer-
ence that would ground the scientific enterprise in the first place. 
The pragmatist shares with the realist skepticism toward any element ground-
ing epistemology or semantics outside our currently accepted scientific frame-
work. But he shows rather more sensitiveness to the frequent objection to realist 
naturalism that its purely "externalist" stance fails to do justice to the questions 
the empiricist tried to answer. For the pragmatist the question of the origin of the 
"normative" aspect of meaning and justified belief is to be found in the practices 
we actually engage in. Observations ought to play a special role in our accepting 
and rejecting theories, because they are the statements we do, in fact, accept and 
come to consensus about. Rules of inference from data to theory, even rules rely-
ing on apparently arbitrary classifications of phenomena into chosen "natural 
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kinds" for inductive projection, or rules as seemingly unconnected with "truth" 
as rules for accepting simpler hypotheses in preference to the less simple, are 
again reasonable rules because they are but the normative idealizations of the 
rules for inference we are inclined to accept. Here, of course, the familiar objec-
tions about the arbitrariness of our conceptual scheme, the possibility of equally 
"rational" alternative schemes, and so on, are deflected either by arguments con-
cerning translation (denying the real possibility of alternative conceptual 
schemes) or by deflationary views about truth and correspondence combined with 
arguments about the incoherence of even stating (from within a chosen frame-
work) the relativistic thesis. 
And of course there are those who think they can have the virtues of both posi-
tions (by being "internal realists") or, rather, that properly understood the posi-
tions coincide. All, in any case, are agreed about a number of things. While a 
"soft" distinction between what is observable and what is not may play some role 
in our epistemology and in our semantics, no hard-and-fast, once-and-for-all, 
theory-independent distinction of this kind can be drawn. While the data of obser-
vation may indeed play a role of some special importance, again in both our un-
derstanding of how meaning accrues to our terms and our understanding of how 
believability accrues to our theories, no special importance of the kind the empiri-
cist attached to the "data of immediate awareness" can be attributed to the role 
of observation. Observation may be part of the web or network of meaning ac-
crual and belief accrual, and a part with some distinctive virtues, but a foundation 
for meaning and rational belief it is not. For there is no such foundation, and the 
whole "hierarchical" model of semantics and epistemology that words like foun-
dation suggest is a misconstrual of how we get on in science. 
2 
But one still finds many philosophers of science enamored of the empiricist ap-
proach to theories. It is something of a paradox, I suppose, that the empiricist ap-
proach to theory seems to be favored most by those philosophers of science who 
spend their time dealing with the structure of fundamental physical theory. But, 
on reflection, this is perhaps not so surprising. It is all very well from a general 
methodological standpoint to tell us that our epistemology and semantical the-
ories, insofar as there can be such things at all, ought to rest upon the "accepted 
best available scientific theory to date," having in mind, usually, the most contem-
porary version of fundamental theoretical physics. But it is another matter to look 
closely at these foundational physical theories and discover how little naive con-
fidence one ought to have in them, and how puzzling the understanding of their 
fundamental concepts can be. At this point, the idea that the epistemology and 
semantics of theories itself rests upon the naive acceptance of these fundamental 
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theories becomes disorienting indeed, and one looks for some other access into 
questions of justification and meaning accrual. 
It can be argued, with some plausibility, that empiricist preconceptions are, 
in fact, "built-in" to many aspects of our most fundamental physical theories. Of 
course, if this is true it might be true merely because the theories as usually 
presented are infected with misguided philosophy of science. Could it not be that 
while the theories, properly understood, do indeed serve as our "best available 
physical theories to date" - for who in the philosophical community will these 
days have the courage (or foolhardiness) to refute the conclusions of the physi-
cists by theorizing from his armchair-their empiricist elements are inessential 
to them? If this were so we could disabuse the philosophers of physics impressed 
by the apparent empiricist preconceptions of foundational physical theory of the 
misunderstanding that if they accept these physical theories they must accept ele-
ments of empiricism as well. 
But to begin exploring this, let me first rehearse some of the foundational 
physics that does at least appear to many to rest upon empiricist (or, at least, em-
piricistlike) preconceptions, beginning with theories of space and time. 
3 
Faced with the null results of the round-trip light experiments designed to de-
termine which inertial reference frame was the ether frame, physics constructed 
many "compensatory" theories, designed to save the ether frame by "explaining 
away" the null results as the joint interaction of two compensating changes, the 
changed velocity of light due to the observer's motion compensated by the effect 
of motion with respect to the ether on the observer's rods and clocks. 
Einstein's revolutionary reinterpretation of the facts that these theories were 
trying to deal with is justly famous. A new theory is proposed that makes no 
predictions that would not follow from the "compensatory" theory if its conse-
quences had been fully followed out. But the new theory is, rightly, considered 
by all a vast improvement over its predictively equivalent but inferior predeces-
sors. And, at least as surface appearances go, the novelty of the new theory rests 
almost entirely on its empiricistically motivated critique of some of our most fa-
miliar concepts. The fundamental move is to focus on our understanding of what 
it is for two events to be "simultaneous" when they are spatially separated from 
one another. Since whether or not two such events are simultaneous is not, it is 
argued, a matter open to our direct observational knowledge, some inference, 
mediated by some causal process, must ground our beliefs about distant simul-
taneity. 
Next Einstein criticizes several approaches to establishing distant simultaneity 
relations that might have worked but that, in the face of new observational results, 
cannot. Limitations on the velocity of transmission of causal signals makes it im-
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possible to establish simultaneity by using causal signals of arbitrarily high veloc-
ity and so ever narrowing down the transmission time from the emission to the 
reception of the signal. We might think of using transported clocks to establish 
distant simultaneity, but the very necessity of the compensatory theory introduced 
to explain away the null results of the round-trip experiments makes it clear that 
transported clocks will not even provide a unique specification of the event at a 
distance simultaneous with a given event. Finally Einstein suggests the famous 
"radar" method, using reflected light beams and local clocks, to establish simul-
taneity; and he clearly demonstrates how such a specification of the simultaneity 
relation will lead to one that gives different pairs of events as simultaneous rela-
tive to the state of motion of the agent carrying c;mt the radar stipulation of simul-
taneity. 
The point to be made here is just how strong one empiricist assumption is that 
is being built-in to this whole critical program. Simultaneity for events at a point 
and continuity along lightlike paths are taken for granted as "observables" in the 
Einstein argument. But the empiricism doesn't really rest in any assumption that 
these relations are themselves immune to a critique that shows them not to be in 
some sense theoretically untainted "direct observational" features of the world. 
Rather it is in the assumption that, whatever counts as observational, distant 
simultaneity is not a legitimate observational feature of the world that is the 
characteristically empiricist move. Without the assumption that simultaneity for 
spatially separated events is "in principle" unavailable to our direct inspectional 
access, now and forever, independently of which theoretical framework we pick 
as the correct one to describe the world, it is hard to see how Einstein's argument 
ever gets going. 
Once this general assumption is made., there are, to be sure, many alternative 
reconstructions of the relativistic argument that can be formulated. Einstein him-
self, of course, at least at this stage in his thinking, takes the method for the deter-
mination of simultaneity he has proposed as "definitional." It is, according to him 
here, a stipulation on our part that it is events so related by reflected light signals 
that we will take to be simultaneous. This approach leads to a long development 
of the school of thought that takes this aspect of the space-time structure (and 
other aspects as well) to be a matter for "conventional choice" on our part, and 
to a general line that the underdetermination of full theoretical content by all pos-
sible observational data can only lead to skepticism, permissivism, or convention-
alism with regard to theoretical truth. 
Certainly that is not the only direction in which we could move to reconstruct 
the epistemology of the situation. A major alternative to such a conventionalist 
reading of the situation would be any one of the realist approaches to theory that 
attempts in one way or another to rationalize the selection of the special relativis-
tic space-time against the number of observationally equivalent theories as the 
"most rationally believable" theory that accounts for the data. Whether the ap-
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proach be one through the construction of a confirmation theory that assigns 
differing degrees of "probability" to theories that are observationally indistin-
guishable, or one that proposes some defensible notion of "inference to the best 
explanation," or one or another of those approaches that relies upon considera-
tions of simplicity or methodological conservatism to motivate the choice of the-
ory, one is (unless these lead too quickly to a pragmatist rereading of the whole 
situation) still within the realm of a basically empiricist approach to theoretical 
belief, so long as the very special role of the observable as "ground" of epistemic 
access to reasonable belief is held onto. Only if one were to begin to deny the 
Einsteinian presupposition that a feature of the world like the simultaneity of 
separated events was truly distinguishable in principle from local simultaneity 
and continuity along a lightlike path, in being, unlike them, "in principal immune 
to observational determination," would one begin to reconstruct the selection of 
special relativity in a fundamentally anti-empiricist way. 
A similar characterization of the situation holds when we look at the Einstein-
ian semantical analysis of distant simultaneity as holds when we explore the 
epistemological aspects of his critique. Einstein, taking distant simultaneity to be 
outside the range of observable features, argues that the concept 'simultaneous' 
must be explicity defined, using only concepts referring to "observables" in order 
to have meaning within a physical theory. Those skeptical of any hard-and-fast 
analytic/synthetic distinction among the propositions of physical theory will 
likely allow for a looser connection between the terms purporting to refer to the 
unobservables and those referring to the observables. A favorite account is the 
familiar one in which terms in theories get their meaning from the place they hold 
in the entire theory so that the meaning to be attributed to a term referring to an 
unobservable becomes dependent upon the role played by the term in the theory 
as a whole and upon the global structure of the theory which, as a whole, gives 
rise to its body of observational consequences. 
Here, once again, there will be many options and many consequences of them. 
If one's theory of meaning accrual for the nonobservational part of the vocabulary 
is one that results in all theories having the same observational consequences be-
ing declared "equivalent" to one another on the basis of the way meaning is ac-
quired by the theoretical vocabulary, one will have an easy time undercutting the 
threat of skepticism raised by a plethora of observationally equivalent theoretical 
alternatives. But one will find one's "realism" with regard to theoretical reference 
slipping out of one's grasp, and the pressure toward some "eliminationist" account 
of theoretical reference hard to resist. On the other hand a finer-grained notion 
of theoretical equivalence, perhaps demanding that theories be taken to "say the 
same thing" only when they both "save the same phenomena" and bear to one an-
other some appropriate structural interrelation at the theoretical level (such as in-
terdefinability of their theoretical terms), will make it easier to remain a realist 
but will make it harder to solve the epistemic problems raised by underdetermina-
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tion. Is the special theory of relativity "saying the same thing" as the compensa-
tory ether theories, but in a "descriptively simpler" way; or is it the case, rather, 
that the theories are quite distinct in "what they say about the world," with, per-
haps, special relativity to be preferred as the true alternative on the basis of some 
notion of simplicity as a mark of believability, where simplicity is not merely sim-
plicity of expression? 
The main point here is that all of these familiar alternatives are basically in 
the empiricist mold. A theory of meaning accrual that dismisses the semantic im-
port of the distinction between observables and nonobservables, or one that bases 
the very notion of meaningfulness on features not related to observation and os-
tensive definition, is anti-empiricist. But one that pllices observation terms in a 
special, "grounding" category, and that tries to understand the accrual of meaning 
by the other terms in the vocabulary by their connection through theory to the 
observables (however weakened that connection is taken to be from the rigid de-
mand of explicit definition) is basically an empiricist theory of meaning. And the 
standard variants on the role of terms like simultaneous for separated events in 
the foundation of special relativity almost all gravitate toward some variant or 
other of such an empiricist semantic account. 
But it is not only in the foundations of the special theory of relativity that we 
find empiricist epistemological and empiricist semantic assumptions "built-in to" 
the physical theories themselves. The general theory of relativity, Einstein's sec-
ond great contribution to modern space-time theories and second great revolution 
in our conception of space and time, rests in a structure of argumentation that al-
most exactly parallels his founding of the special theory in a basically empiricist 
critique of the compensatory ether theories. The problem with the compensatory 
ether theories is that there are too many of them all equally compatible with the 
same class of observational data. Special relativity, with its denial of a preferred 
inertial frame, obviates the need to pick one inertial frame as special. But the 
same problem infects the theory of gravitation, even Newtonian gravitation. As 
Maxwell 1 argued in the late nineteenth century, within the Newtonian gravita-
tional theory we could not observationally distinguish a world with no uniform 
gravitational force from one with a uniform gravitational force everywhere of 
whatever magnitude you liked. Later researchers exploring the possibility of cos-
mological models in the Newtonian framework realized that the most common 
models, of a uniformly filled cosmos in slowing expansion or accelerating con-
traction, would, in the Newtonian framework, have as comoving observers one 
distinguished by being inertial while all the others were accelerated. Yet each of 
the accelerated observers would be unaware of their acceleration since, being due 
to gravity, it would not be indicated on their acceleration measuring devices at-
tached to their reference frames. Both of these "paradoxical" elements of Newto-
nian theory of gravitation are due, of course, to the special "universal" nature of 
gravitational force, which accelerates everything on which it acts to the same de-
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gree independently of the constitution of the test object and its size. The result 
of this special nature of the gravitational force is that within Newtonian theory 
there will be many possible worlds indistinguishable from one another by any ob-
servational test. 
It is just this otioseness of theory that Einstein, once again, obviates by the the-
ory of general relativity. Here gravitational force is replaced by the curvature of 
space-time, with the paths of "free" particles taken to be timelike geodesics in the 
space-time and the paths oflight rays to be null geodesics, where 'free' now means 
free of all forces other than gravity. Of course this new theory doesn't differ from 
the Newtonian in just this way. The greatest modification necessary to the Newto-
nian picture is one that is almost forced on the theorist by relativistic considera-
tions. The net result of the relativistic considerations is a series of plausibility ar-
guments to the effect that in a relativistic context we may expect gravity to have 
metric effects, revealed by the standard measuring instruments of measuring 
tapes and clocks, as well as its familiar dynamical effects. These additional obser-
vationally determinable results of the presence of gravity are neatly encompassed 
also in the picture of gravity as curvature of the space-time manifold. 
What needs to be emphasized here is the importance for Einstein's arguments 
of aspects of the empiricist account of our access to the world and to meaningful 
assertion about it. Again a standard repetoire of features is presupposed open to 
observational determination: the paths of free particles and of light rays; coinci-
dences among measuring tapes; and the readings of the standardized clocks, 
which also tick in coincidence when brought to the same place. Much more im-
portantly, there is, in this physical construction, a presupposed standard repetoire 
of quantities that are taken without question to be in principle, forever, immune 
to observational determination. Were the structure of space-time itself-rather 
than that which is revealed to us by moving particles, light rays, measuring tapes, 
and clocks- available to our direct inspection, the whole ground of the plausibil-
ity of the Einstein arguments for expecting gravity to reveal itself in nonfiat metric 
aspects of space-time would be severely weakened. And were "the gravitational 
field strength" itself available to our inspection, rather than the effect of gravity 
as revealed in motion and in metric measuring instruments, the virtue of general 
relativity (as opposed to the theories that posit gravity as a field superimposed 
over an underlying space-time structure), that is, its virtue of replacing a manifold 
of observationally indistinguishable possibilities by a single space-time model, 
would vanish. 
The pattern of thought here, which consists in characterizing a portion of the 
consequences of the existing theories as immune in principle from observational 
determination, of then locating the features of the theory that result in the theory 
having parameters immune in perpetuity from observational determination, and 
of then replacing these theories with one with a "thinned-down" ontology less sub-
ject to the underdetermination by observation difficulties; exactly parallels the 
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way in which special relativity is introduced as superior to the compensatory ether 
theories. In both cases an epistemological and semantic critique of already exist-
ing theory, founded on presuppositions that at least appear to be empiricist, is at 
the core of the scientific revolution. 
At this point, of course, many alternative options for understanding the episte-
mology and semantics of the situation can be imagined. Reductionist approaches 
take the meaning of the theories to be encompassed in their observational conse-
quences, and vitiate the skeptical threat by declaring all of the observationally 
equivalent alternatives mere alternative expressions of one and the same theory. 
Anti-reductionists take the theories (general relativity vs. any of the ftat-space-
time-plus-gravitational-field alternatives) to be inequivalent to each other, relying 
upon some account of meaning in theory that, one way or another, attributes 
meaningful content over and above the sum of observational content to the the-
ories. Then they try, again one way or another, to rationalize our theory choice 
among alternatives observationally indiscriminable from one another-be this by 
simplicity, methodological conservatism, a priori plausibility of theory, or what-
ever. But the common empiricist aspects to all these accounts are clear. Some 
parts of theory are in principle immune from observational determination. If we 
are to understand the meaning of the parts of theory dealing with the in principle 
unobservable, it must be by some manner in which understood meaning of the 
observational part of the theory works upward into the part dealing with the unob-
servable. And if we are to believe the assertions of the theory dealing with the 
in principle unobservable, it can only be by an upward motion of confirmation 
from the observable confirmed by its connection with empirically available ex-
perimental result, however such observational results are utilized in some con-
firmatory scheme. 
4 
We have looked at two cases, both from space-time theories, in which theories 
have been "thinned" of some of their concepts and their ontologies "thinned" of 
posited features of the world on the basis of a semantic and epistemological cri-
tique that is fundamentally empiricist in nature. It might be worthwhile looking 
at at least one case, again from space-time theories, that illustrates the claim that 
such conceptual and ontological pruning of theories is not a completed task, but 
one that will undoubtedly result in further critical assaults on current concepts and 
current ontology as our theory develops. 
There is a long-standing program in the philosophy of space-time that advo-
cates the claim that some or all of our space-time features can be "reduced" to 
causal features of the world. Sometimes it is said that the direction of time is 
"causally definable." Sometimes the claim is that the space-time metric or the 
space-time topology is "reducible to causal features of the world." There is not 
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just one program called the "casual theory of space-time," but, rather, a plethora 
of such programs. And the programs differ from one another in their claims, in 
their motivations, and in the empirical and philosophical arguments they use to 
defend their theses. While some of the claims of"reducibility" would like to argue 
that space-time features of the world "reduce" to causal features in a manner 
analogous to the way light reduces to electromagnetic radiation or tables reduce 
to arrays of molecules, other causal reductionist theories bear a closer analogy 
to the phenomenalist's claim that material objects "reduce" to sense data. The 
former style of programs relies upon some alleged scientific discovery (or possi-
bility of scientific discovery) that one class of entities of features in the world "is 
identical to" some other class of entities of features, an identity allegedly estab-
lished by empirical discovery in science. The latter style of program relies, 
rather, on a semantic-epistemic critique of theories, in the empiricist vein, similar 
to the critiques we have discussed above. It is to the latter style of "causal theory 
of space-time" that I will direct my attention. 
We can begin with Robb's attempt, 2 early in this century, to formulate the 
space-time of special relativity entirely in terms of the single primitive 'after', 
taken as the relation between events when one is, in relativistic terms, absolutely 
after the other, i.e., after it and causally connectible to it. Refinements of Robb's 
approach show us that we can, indeed, define all of the metric features of the 
space-time of special relativity solely in terms of one event being causally con-
nectible to another. This suggests the possibility of at least some version of a 
"causal theory of the space-time metric" in the theoretical framework of special 
relativity. 
For reasons I will not go into here I think it implausible to claim that the results 
of Robb, and of those who have refined his methods, really do show us that within 
the context of special relativity we really can (or, rather, ought to) define the 
space-time metric in terms of causal connectibility among events. In any case the 
program falls apart when one moves from the world of special relativity to the 
many different space-time worlds allowed by the general theory of relativity. In 
this broader context, it turns out that there are many space-time worlds whose 
metric structures differ greatly from one another, but that are exactly alike as far 
as the causal connectibility relations among the events in the worlds are con-
cerned. These are all the worlds that, although metrically unalike, are related to 
one another by a so-called conformal isomorphism. 
For this reason, in the general relativistic context it is usually the weaker struc-
ture of the topology of the space-time, rather than its metric structure, that is al-
leged to be "causally definable." Here the claim is that the full specification of the 
causal structure of the space-time is already a full specification of its topological 
structure. But, again, the issue is not a simple one. 
If we take causal connectibility among events as the basic causal structure of 
the world to which all topological structure of space-time is to be reduced, then 
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we run into a problem blocking this program if we allow as a possible general 
relativistic world any space-time world consistent with the basic equations of the 
theory. There are possible space-time worlds that have ''pathological" causal 
structure. An example is a world with a closed timelike loop in it, which is a one-
dimensional collection of events, all timelike related to one another, but whose 
topology is that of the circle rather than the open line. Events in this loop cause 
later events (in the local sense), but the casual chain ultimately arrives back at 
the initiating event. Even if we bar such closed timelike lines, weaker causal 
pathologies are still possible in the form of "almost closed" causal (i.e., timelike 
or lightlike) one-dimensional paths. A variety of restrictions on such causal 
pathologies can be imposed, the strongest being the demand for "stable causality," 
which is the demand that there not be any closed causal paths obtainable by any 
infinitesimal distortion of the actual space-time structure. For present purposes 
what is interesting is that if causal pathologies are permitted, then there can be, 
in violation of our first version of a causal account of space-time topology, worlds 
that are alike in causal connectibility structure, but that are unalike topologically. 
One solution to this dilemma is to insist that causal pathologies not obtain, al-
though it isn't fully clear why one ought to believe that this is necessarily so. A 
more interesting move is to try to restore the possibility of casual specification 
for the topology by moving to a richer notion of the causal structure of the space-
time. An important result (due to D. Malament3) tells us that, if we confine our 
attention only to the standard manifold topologies usually taken to be the topolo-
gies of space-time, then in any world compatible with general relativity the total-
ity of continuous causal paths fully determines the topology of the space-time. 
That is where the totality of facts as to whether or not two events are connected 
by some continuous causal path of events or other will not fully fix the topoplogy; 
the specification of what does or does not constitute a continuous segment of 
causally connectible events will do the job. 
Why is such a result relevant to our pursuit of empiricist presuppositions in 
physical theories? The relevance is clear when one considers the importance 
granted to "causal" paths in these results. Why should we care whether or not the 
set of continuous causal (or even merely timelike) paths determines the topology? 
The set of continuous spacelike paths, for example, also fully fixes the manifold 
topology. I think exploration into the motivation behind this version of a "causal" 
theory of space-time topology reveals to us the presupposition that it is continuity 
along timelike paths that is the revelation to us by observational means of the 
topological structure of the space-time. Continuity along timelike paths is avail-
able to us because timelike paths are the kinds of paths we as observers, or ideal-
ized pointlike versions of us, can traverse, and they are, therefore, the kinds of 
paths whose continuity we can "observationally" determine. The presupposition 
here is similar to Einstein's presupposition in his critique of distant simultaneity, 
that we are entitled to assume that we can determine the selfsame identity through 
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time of the light signal sent, reflected, and received, to determine which event 
at a distance is simultaneous with a given local event. From this perspective the 
so-called causal theory of space-time topology seems misnamed. It is rather an 
epistemologically motivated critical examination, just like those that founded spe-
cial and general relativity, but now into the components of the newer theories, 
once again looking for the "hard observational facts" underlying the meaning ac-
crual of the terms in the theory and the warrant accrual of the propositions. But 
in this case any relevant "thinning down" of theoretical concepts and theoretical 
ontology remains in the future. For we do not yet have the theory that would re-
place the full space-time theory in the event our critique showed it to be still otiose 
from the point of this empiricist-critical examination. 
That the theory still is otiose in this way seems to be indicated by some addi-
tional facts about topology. The results we have discussed above tell us that, so 
long as we stick to one of the usual manifold topologies presupposed by general 
relativity, the totality of information about what constitutes continuous timelike 
(or timelike and lightlike, i.e., causal) paths in the space-time fully fixes the topol-
ogy of the space-time. But there are many other possible topologies than these 
usual manifold topologies. Typical alternative topologies of mathematical interest 
are the "finest topologies compatible with the continuity along causal curves" 
generated by taking as a basis of open sets in the space-time all those sets of points 
(i.e., event locations) whose openness is compatible with the continuity specifica-
tions along the causal world lines. Since the specification of the basis of open sets 
in a space fully determines its topology, this specifies a new kind of topology for 
the general relativistic space-times. Such topologies, in certain interesting ways, 
"code" the causal structure of the space-time more naturally than the usual mani-
fold topologies. 
But such topologies also lead us to talk of the topology of the space-time in 
a radically different way from our usual description of it in terms of the standard 
manifold topologies. What are we to make of these novel topologies? The situa-
tion seems familiar on reflection. Once again it seems as though we have a variety 
of theoretical accounts of the space-time of the world from which we must select 
an accepted theoretical account. Once again we have the intuition that our full 
body of possible observational data, now taken to be all the facts about continuity 
along causal (or, perhaps, epistemically traversable) paths, is insufficient to do 
the selection for us. Once again the usual thoughts arise. Shouldn't we say that 
the alternative topologies, all of which agree on continuity along causal paths, are 
all "equivalent" to one another, presenting merely alternative descriptions of one 
and the same world? Or, rather, should we maintain that these topologies present 
genuinely alternative pictures of the world, and that we must seek for some 
methodological rule (simplicity, conservatism, a priori plausibility, or what have 
you) to tell us which of these empirically equivalent, but not fully equivalent, ac-
counts of the structure of the world is the most reasonable to believe? Or should 
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we just despair as skeptics of ever knowing the true structure of the world? Or 
advocate one or another version of permissive conventionality? 
It will be interesting to await further developments in the physical theory of 
space-time. It seems clear that we cannot assure ourselves that the kind of critical 
"thinning" of ontology that Einstein gave us in the discovery of the special and 
general theories of relativity has reached its climax. One cannot foretell what fu-
ture physics will look like, but it seems clear that we can expect this critically 
motivated endeavor to continue. 
5 
One further case might be useful to illustrate the point being made here, since 
it, unlike the others, is not drawn from the physics of space and time. 
The early history of quantum mechanics is a familiar story. Working from 
quite different perspectives Heisenberg (attempting to turn traditional Fourier 
analysis into a kind of "two-dimensional Fourier analysis" in order to predict in-
tensities of spectral lines, known to be coded by two parameters instead of the 
traditional one parameter specifying harmonic level) and Schrodinger (looking 
for an equation whose solution would be the de Broglie wave posited by the latter 
as being dual to all particle motions in analogy with the Planck-Einstein wave-
particle duality of light) both invented theories that were able to predict the same 
quantities, the energy levels of electrons in atoms undisturbed and disturbed, fre-
quencies and intensities of spectral lines, etc. Astonishingly the predictions were 
numerically identical despite the apparently radically different nature of the two 
theories. 
The situation was finally clarified when Schrodinger, in a justly famous paper, 
showed the "equivalence" of the two theories, by demonstrating a structural rela-
tion between them that guaranteed identity for their "observational predictions." 
Later theorists, in the so familiar manner, found ways of expressing the common 
features of the two theories in a more abstract format, which relinquished some 
of the aspects of the two approaches where their apparent differences lay. And 
physicists from that time on spoke of the "Heisenberg representation" and the 
"Schrodinger representation" of quantum mechanics. Both "representations" as-
sign mathematical structures to systems "prepared" by appropriate experimental 
procedures. Both "representations" assign distinct mathematical structures to 
quantities we wish to observe by some measuring experiment. Both compute the 
theories' "outcomes," now taken to be "possible values" of the observable to be 
measured and assignments of probability distributions over the set of such pos-
sible outcomes, by combining their mathematical structures for prepared "states" 
and selected "observables" in appropriate ways. And both predict the same pos-
sible outcomes for any observable; and, for a given preparation, a given time in-
terval, and a given dynamic intervention into the system in question over that time 
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interval, predict the same probability distribution over those observable values. 
Where they differ, fundamentally, is that the Schrodinger picture puts the changes 
over time into a mathematical evolution of the representative for the prepared 
state, and the Heisenberg picture puts it into a mathematical evolution over time 
of the representative of the measured observable. 
For our purposes the structural similarities with the space-time cases are clear. 
In order for this understanding of quantum mechanics to go through, there must 
be firm agreement that certain quantities, the mathematical representatives of pre-
pared states and of observables, be taken to be, in principle, not quantities open 
to observational determination. Otherwise we could not be assured that mere 
commonality of probability distributions over observable values, or such com-
monality plus the appropriate isomorphism at the theoretical level, would be 
enough for us to declare the two accounts mere "representational variants" of one 
another. It is our assurance that "states themselves" cannot ever be an object of 
"direct observational determination," which makes us reject the claim someone 
might make that Schrodinger and Heisenberg don't "say the same thing," because 
in the Schrodinger picture states change and in the Heisenberg picture they don't; 
and that we might "someday be able to 'look and see' which really occurs." And 
beginning with this assurance that some aspects of the theoretical structure are, 
in principle, immune from observational determination, we continue with the fa-
miliar program of "thinning out" the theoretical structure to get rid of the otiose 
elements that make alternative representations give the false appearance of offer-
ing alternative theories of the world. 
6 
All of these cases have, then, a series of common elements. First there is an 
intuitively accepted distinction between what is observable and what is nonob-
servable, which is taken to be a distinction "in principle" and one relative to which 
a critical semantic and epistemological attitude toward the existing theoretical 
structure is necessary. This requires not an intuitive agreement of what are to 
count, now and forever, as the true "observables," relative to which the theory 
can be tested, but, rather, an agreement that some features spoken of by the the-
ories are, now and forever, in principle unobservable. It requires, that is, some 
assurance that we will never be able to bring "direct observation," however we 
understand that phrase, to bear on determining what goes on with regard to some 
specific quantities putatively posited of the world by the existing theoretical 
structure. 
Next there is the awareness that a multiplicity of theories talking about such 
putative unobservable structures of the world, and saying incompatible things 
about it, will agree on the remaining facts derivable from them. That is, that there 
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are many apparently distinct theories, all of whose distinctness is "trapped" in the 
realm taken as being that of in principle unobservability. 
Finally there is the program of reconstructing the existing theory in a novel 
way that will, in response to this problem of the underdetermination of theory by 
evidential data, look for some new alternative account that is at least less infected 
with undeterminable features, features posited but characterized by some class 
of parameters whose values can't be fixed by observational determination, than 
were the existing theories that are now realized to be so infected. 
It is interesting to reflect a bit on some of the reasons why it is fundamental 
physics that seems to attract this continuing program of semantic-epistemic cri-
tique. One reason, surely, is that the striking and unexpected facts revealed to us 
by the ever-increasing power of experimental observation are frequently so star-
tling in their nature as to require some radical revision or other of our concepts 
and our hypotheses. Faced with the null results of the round-trip experiments that 
experimentally ground the special theory of relativity, or the manifold of puzzling 
and anomalous results that led to quantum mechanics, the scientific community 
is faced with the realization that something quite radical must be done to make 
our physical theory accord with the observational facts. In the face of such a need 
for radical revision of one sort or another, it is not too surprising that at least some 
insightful thinkers are impelled to reexamine the presupposed fundamental con-
cepts and hypotheses of the most familiarly accepted background theories to see 
if something in them must be challenged. In the face of extraordinary puzzles with 
the data, the comforting admonition to rely upon "general accepted background 
science" in a conservative way seems less than persuasive as the most fruitful way 
to go about things. It is in circumstances like these that the empiricistically moti-
vated doctrine of looking at the earlier theories, to see to what degree the "hard 
facts" really impelled us to accept them, becomes a promising scientific strategy. 
The fact that the novel hypotheses introduced to account for the novel data are 
themselves so radical in nature also cries out for a semantic-epistemic appraisal 
of them. Special relativity introduces space-time, with its denial of an absolute 
simultaneity relation, to replace our traditional notion of space through time. 
General relativity introduces pseudo-Riemannian curved space-time to replace 
traditional flat space-time and traditional gravitation as a field within space-time. 
Quantum theory introduces the novel notions of the state function and the observ-
ables to replace the traditional notion of a state as a point in classical phase space. 
But how are we to understand these novel concepts and hypotheses? And why 
ought we to believe in the hypotheses that utilize them? Here the very novelty of 
the conceptual structure seems to demand of those introducing them that some-
thing substantial be done to explain to the scientific community how the concepts 
and the hypotheses in which they appear are to be understood (i.e., what meaning 
is to be attributed to them) and how they are related to possible observational data 
in ways appropriate to allow the data available to us to provide observational tests 
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of the truth of the new hypotheses. We cannot take such questions for granted, 
as understood, or as built-in to previous scientific practice in well-understood 
ways, when such radically new conceptual structures are being proposed. Even 
"analogy" with older concepts and hypotheses, the sort of thing that works when 
we explain molecules, say, as "like tiny billiard balls too small to see," fails us 
in contexts like these. Instead, a radical appraisal of how these new concepts and 
the hypotheses in which they appear are related to possibilities of evidential ex-
perience seems to be what is in order; and this is just the sort of appraisal the im-
portance of which is the core of the empiricist program in philosophy. 
Another feature that tends to give rise to such semantic-epistemic critical ap-
praisals in these foundational physical contexts is the ability of these problem situ-
ations to realize in concrete form a familiar philosophical puzzle. Since Descartes 
and Hume we have been concerned, as philosophers, with alternative hypotheses 
to our fami.liar ones that "save the same phenomena." Descartes introduces per-
petual dreams and malevolent demons. Hume tells us to consider the fact that our 
belief in the continuity of phenomena when we are not perceptually aware of them 
is grounded more on imaginative projection than any counsel of reason. But the 
alternatives to our usual world scheme proposed by such philosophers are usually 
taken to be puzzles, rather than seriously alternative hypotheses about the nature 
of the world. We take it, as philosophers, that our job is to refute the skeptical 
threat such imaginative alternative world views suggest, but that we ought not to 
seriously consider that the world might really be so radically different from the 
way we usually take it to be. Witness the pragmatist distinction between real 
doubts and the "mere" skeptical doubts of the philosophers, or Hume's admission 
that, no matter how seriously we will think with the learned in our philosophical 
studies, we will always act with the vulgar in the world. 
But in the context of foundational physics we seem to have presented for our 
epistemic appraisal radically different alternative world views. They are fully 
filled out in all detail, unlike the mere sketches offered by the philosophers. And 
nothing initially seems to tell us that only one of these alternative world hypothe-
ses is worth serious consideration, the others to be taken even as hypotheses for 
consideration only with a grain of salt. All of the underdetermined alternatives 
seem, at least initially, on a par as genuine scientific alternatives, and it is no sur-
prise that, in this context of genuine scientific indecision, a reappraisal of how 
observational data is to relate to scientific belief seems in order. 
Finally we ought to note that there are special features of the particular founda-
tional theories we have been dealing with that also play a role in suggesting that, 
in our scientific search for new hypotheses, semantic-epistemic critical appraisal 
is in order. The postulation of space itself, or space-time itself, as a theoretically 
inferred structure of the world, has always been one that has been treated with 
skeptical doubt. Witness the skepticism toward Newton's "space itself' from 
Leibniz through Berkeley to Mach. Both the peculiarity of "space" as an "entity" 
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over and above the ordinary material inhabitants of the world, and such special 
problems as those suggested by Leibniz in his use of the principle of the identity 
of indiscernibles to criticize the postulation of a space, all of whose infinity of 
points were indistinguishable by anything in their own nature from one another, 
have led many to be all along skeptical of the legitimacy of positing space itself 
as one more inferred theoretical structure in the world. For this reason scientists 
and philosophers are "primed" in the kinds of situations of scientific revolution 
described above to be receptive to empiricistically minded semantic-epistemic 
critiques that throw doubts on the way in which such theoretical concepts have 
been used without sufficient questioning in the past. 
A similar situation holds in quantum mechanics. The theory itself arises, at 
least in part and from the Heisenbergian point of view, out of a despair with the 
prospects of reconciling some traditional theoretical notions (the usual notions of 
definite trajectories for the subatomic charged particles and the usual rules as-
sociating such motions with detectable emitted radiation) with the rules governing 
the observables discovered in experiment. From the very beginnings of the the-
ory, there is a tendency to avoid premature commitment to some definitive theo-
retical structure and to look for some calculational system that will predict the 
right correlations among observables without saying too much about explanatory 
theoretical structures that might account for these correlations. Heisenberg, at 
least, is quite self-consciously "positivistic" in his motivations behind the discov-
ery of matrix mechanics. 
Later the manifest peculiarities of the theoretical structures introduced in the 
developed quantum mechanical formalism, peculiarities such as the instantaneous 
change of the state vector upon measurement in a manner totally unaccountable 
in the rules for its dynamic evolution in ordinary processes, or the peculiar nature 
of quantum states as introducing probabilistic correlations for events at spacelike 
separation that cannot be accounted for in any straightforward way in terms of 
previously fixed local parametric hidden variables, again lead to a skepticism, 
based on the special nature of this particular physical theory, with regard to taking 
its apparent theoretical posits in an uncritical manner. Once again an empiricist 
injunction to "see what the hard data actually forces upon us" will be welcomed 
in the context in which an already critical and skeptical attitude to the apparently 
posited theoretical structure has been forced upon us by its intrinsic peculiarities. 
7 
The considerations we have gone through indicate, then, that at the level of 
foundational physical theories, and especially when these theories are subject to 
the severe difficulties encountered when they are radically in conflict with the ob-
servational data, a skeptical attitude with regard to the meaning of some of the 
fundamental concepts and a skeptical attitude with regard to the warrant with 
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which fundamental hypotheses had previously been supported, become not the 
idle speculations of the philosopher but integral parts of the ongoing process by 
which our most important and most general theories of the world are refined and, 
if necessary, replaced. 
That doubts about the intelligibility of concepts or about the warrant that really 
accrues to hypotheses will cause one to reflect on "what the hard data of observa-
tion really provides us" seems inevitable. It is in precisely such conditions of in-
stability of fundamental theory that are incipiently revolutionary that the consol-
ing advice of the pragmatist to rely upon "what we have previously practiced" or 
of the realist to rely on "what our best available science tells us about the world" 
seem out of place. It is just such notions as "what we have practiced" and "what 
our theories have told us" that are in doubt in these contexts. It is when a scientific 
"form of life" has proven to be a failed form, by that most important of test of 
success in scientific life- the ability to correctly predict the data of observation, 
that the sense of a need for a radical exploration into the grounds by which we 
have taken meaning to accrue to our theoretical concepts and warrant to accrue 
to our theoretical hypotheses is intuitively felt to be called for. And it is in just 
these circumstances that the resort to "what we really have available to us from 
observational experience" naturally arises as the touchstone on which such a cri-
tique of existing concepts and hypotheses is to be grounded. 
Can the notion of "what the data provides us" be understood here in a prag-
matist or realist vein? I think not. For the pragmatist, the distinction between what 
is observable and what is not is a fluid one. Most pragmatist accounts will rely 
on some notion of spontaneous communal agreement to pick out some body of 
sentences quickly assented to by the population in general in a stimulus situation 
to fix on what, if anything, can be called observational assertions. From this point 
of view, what would be to the empiricist inferred propositions (but inferred on 
the basis of inference licenses so deeply rooted as to result in unconscious and 
spontaneous inference) would, to the pragmatist, count as assertions just as fully 
observational as those the empricist takes to be truly based on observation alone. 
But examination of such features of the physical critique we have been exploring 
as Einstein's critique of our universally held idea that we knew what we were talk-
ing about when we spoke of events "being at the same time," and that we meant 
the same thing by this for spatially separated as for coincident events, shows us 
that the notion of observability (or, again, more importantly, nonobservability) 
that the physicist has in mind in these critiques is not the merely psychological 
feature of spontaneity of judgment that the pragmatist has in mind. 
Nor, I think, does what the "realist" tells us about the observational/nonobser-
vational distinction do full justice to the critical context we have been exploring. 
From the realist perspective, "what is observable" is a matter for our best avail-
able science, including psychology, neurophysiology, etc., to determine for us. 
But in the critical contexts of physics, where distant simultaneity is rejected as 
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an observable simply because it is not a local notion; where the gravitational field 
magnitude is rejected as an observable because it is not by itself expressed in the 
motions of bodies or light rays or in the readings of metrical measuring instru-
ments; where the spacelike continuity of lines is rejected as observable because 
of its "in principle nonsurveyability;" and where the state vector itself of quantum 
mechanics is rejected as observable because its values are not the values of what 
is taken, in the theory, as a primitive, undefined notion of the results of measure-
ment processes; there seems to be an at least quasi a priori element presupposed 
in the characterization of where to draw the line between that which at least might 
be characterized as directly observable and that which certainly can not so be 
characterized. 
Once this characterization is drawn, of course, then "what the theories them-
selves tell us about the world" does, indeed, become essential to the critical pro-
gram. If we take local relations among events and continuity along paths travers-
able by an "observer" as the full body of observational data relevant to a 
determination of the topology of space-time, for example, then it is indeed our 
"best available theory," relativity, that tells us that some paths, the spacelike ones, 
posited in our theory are "out of bounds" when it comes to critically examining 
the semantic and epistemological basis on which our account of the world's topol-
ogy rests. For given this scientific theory as true, paths of that kind are not so 
traversable. But the restriction to local data as the only data available to an ob-
server in the first place, the core of what gets the critical program going, is not 
a consequence of our "best available physical theory" in any reasonable sense, but 
is presupposed by us on some other basis. 
The immediate inspiration for the semantic-epistemological critique of exist-
ing theory is invariably the discovery that, in the light of one's presuppositions, 
certain facts are in principle immune from direct observational determination, in 
the light of novel observational facts, and in the light of the realization that novel 
theoretical options are available to us, it turns out that our theoretical structure 
of the world is, in its current form, apparently radically underdetermined by the 
data. Too many theories we take to be inequivalent to one another all seem equally 
good in the face of all possible observational results: too many ether theories, 
once the null results of the Michelson-Morley experiment are in; too many 
gravitational theories, once some version of the principle of equivalence is estab-
lished; too many space-time topologies, once it is realized that a variety can be 
made compatible with all topological facts along traversable paths; too many ver-
sions of the dynamics of quantum states compatible with the probability distribu-
tions among the values of observables that are the outcomes of the theoretical 
manipulation. 
It is in the face of this newly realized problem of underdetermination (or, in 
some cases, in a reawakened interest in an underdetermination problem that had 
existed for a long time but had been swept under the rug) that the critical examina-
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tion of our access to theoretical meaning and our warrant for theoretical assertion 
is undertaken. And it is in these contexts that the suggestion is inevitably made 
that the most reasonable response is to thin out our theoretical conceptual struc-
ture, eliminating some apparent theoretical reference and some putative theoreti-
cal assertion, in order to arrive at a "cleaner" version of theory less subject to the 
infection ofundeterminable theoretical parameters and underdetermination of the 
theory by data in general. 
Need such empiricistically motivated semantic-epistemic criticism of existing 
theory always lead us down a slippery slope to an ultimately positivist view of 
the world, where all theoretical reference is taken as at best instrumental in na-
ture, with the only real reference being reference to some fixed basis of "directly, 
immediately observational sensory contents"? It just isn't clear. For we don't yet 
really understand enough about how such empiricist critique from within an on-
going context of realistic science is supposed to work. Much depends upon how 
we ultimately resolve crucial questions about meaning accrual and warrant 
accrual. 
Consider, for example, the "realist" view with regard to theories that, while 
starting from the empiricistic critical position we have been exploring, holds that 
the end of such criticism is not some phenomenalistic eliminativist program of 
taking all observationally equivalent theories to "say the same thing;" but is, in-
stead, the selection of a preferred theory from the set of all the phenomenally 
equivalent alternatives, or, rather, from all those alternatives presently under 
consideration whose disagreements with one another are, we are sure, trapped 
at the nonobservational level. 
Special relativity, the argument frequently goes, is preferred to the alternative 
ether theories since it, unlike them, does not introduce absolute velocity as an un-
determinable parameter. It is preferred on the basis of ontological and conceptual 
parsimony or simplicity. But it is still a realistic theory positing "space-time itself' 
as an explanatory structure. The "inertial frames" of space-time remain as "not 
directly observable," but as the reference frames relative to which acceleration 
shows up in mechanical effects (inertial forces) and optical effects (non-null 
results for round-trip experiments, for example). But special relativity is to be 
preferred also, it is alleged, to the mere set of its observational consequences 
taken as a theory. For that latter "theory," unlike the special theory with its theo-
retical space-time structure, fails to offer genuine explanations of the observable 
phenomena. 
An almost identical stance can be taken with regard to general relativity as op-
posed to any of the flat-space-time-plus-gravitational-field alternatives to it with 
the same observational consequences. Here again it can be argued that general 
relativity is preferrable to its theoretical alternatives on grounds of conceptual and 
ontological parsimony and in not having, as the other theories do, an intrinsically 
undeterminable parameter at the theoretical level. And, again, it can be argued 
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that it is superior to its purely phenomenal alternative in that it still offers an ex-
planatory account of the observational facts. 
Such a realist approach is still basically empiricist in its structure. It is now 
a variant, not of the kind of eliminative empricism that results in phenomenalism, 
but of the realist empiricisms that, while taking observation as the starting point 
for meaning and warrant accrual, allow for the possibility of semantic principles 
that allow for the legitimation of meaning attribution (of a not merely instrumen-
talist or representationalist sort) to terms going beyond reference to the observ-
able, and for the possibility of epistemic principles legitimizing warrant accrual 
to hypotheses whose content outruns the observable and correlations among its 
particular contents. 
What seems clear, however, is that realist and pragmatist accounts of meaning 
and warrant will not do full justice to the semantic-epistemological situation in 
these cases where it is the most general and fundamental background theories of 
our scientific world view, and the most entrenched of our scientific communal lin-
guistic and inferential practices, that are up for questioning. At least some of the 
ingredients of an empiricist approach are called for here: a rather rigid and 
theory-independent notion of what is in principle immune from direct observa-
tional determination, a scrutiny of meaningfulness for theoretical concepts rooted 
in an examination of how they relate to what is available to us in direct ex-
perience, and a critical scrutiny of the warrant by which we have held our theoret-
ical hypotheses, again rooted in an exploration of the extent to which they can 
be held to account by the observational data or by that data in combination with 
some inferential rules that are themselves "above" the standards of justification 
provided by resort to "what our present science tell us" or ''what is entrenched 
in our present scientific practice." 
This kind of empiricism-as-critique, practiced in the context of an ongoing 
refinement of the existing theories in our background science, would seem to re-
quire that we always be in a state of readiness to rethink the grounds of meaning-
fulness for our theoretical concepts, the grounds for positing our theoretical on-
tology, and the grounds for accepting our most basic and pervasive theoretical 
hypothesis from what is, essentially, an empiricist perspective. This is not an em-
piricism that tells us that we can find some theory less observational language to 
which all of our theoretical assertions can be reduced by translation. For, at least 
on its surface, it neither requires for its critical stance belief in the accessibility 
of some once-and-for-all-time "detheorized" observational language as basis, nor 
a belief in the reducibility or translatability, once and for all time, of all the theo-
retical discourse we have or will encounter into such a pretheoretical observation 
language. 
The kind of empiricism that seems to be called for by the essential role played 
by semantic and epistemic critique in foundational physical theory does require 
that we take a "hierarchical" attitude toward our concepts and hypotheses, giving 
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those "closer to the pure observable" primary status in the work of meaning ac-
crual and the accrual of warrant for belief. The reader will, perhaps, be reminded 
in this context of some of C.I. Lewis's attitudes toward the "given" as a kind of 
inexpressible limit ideal and of Popper's remarks in The Logic of Scientific Dis-
covery on the "conventionality" of what at any time is taken as the level that counts 
for theoretical purposes as the level of "observation." What would be called for 
to make this sense of empiricism more plausible as a viable account of our scien-
tific method would be to accompany this attempted demonstration of the way in 
which such a critical empiricist attitude is presupposed, and, indeed, "built-in" 
to our contemporary foundational physics, with some extended understanding of 
how such a critical empiricism differs from more traditional "bottom-up" founda-
tional empiricism and how, when all of the consequences of the critical empiri-
cism are thought through, it can avoid the familiar difficulties with that more 
traditional empiricism that drove away so many of its sympathizers to the alterna-
tive pragmatist or realist perspectives. 
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